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Corruption and all its consequences as a complex anti-societal phenomenon is not something unique
for this state. In this context it is hard to disagree with the remark made by President Leonid Kuchma
during his visit to the U.S. in May 1997 that the words mafia and corruption are not of Ukrainian
origin. However, not just individual cases of corruption and bribery, but pervasive corruption in
Ukraine has deteriorated into a major challenge and the rope strangling the Ukrainian economy.
Every year the rope gets tighter, preventing transparency of actions of the authorities at all levels,
hindering economic development, pushing businesses into the shadow sector and scaring away foreign
investors. The fact that since 1991 Ukraine has attracted only US$ 3.2 billion in direct foreign
investment, or about US$ 55 per capita, speaks for itself. The figure, far too low for Ukraine's needs
and potential, can be also attributed, to a large extent, to the image of Ukraine as a safe heaven for
corruption.
According to the Transparency International 1999 ranking, Ukraine's index of perceived corruption is
at 2.6 (from 10 as the lowest level to 0 as the highest level of corruption). Ukraine occupied 77th
position of 99 countries considered in the survey. There are many other rankings and studies that may
well illustrate how serious the problem is. Similarly, there have been a number of measures in the field
of legislation, some more inconsistent that others, taken by the Ukrainian state to counter the challenge
and boost its image internationally. However, their effectiveness and adequacy yet remains to be seen,
for fighting corruption cannot be measured by adopted resolutions, reports and official meetings, but by
manifestations of political will to increase transparency of governance for the society that is badly
needed nowadays.
The first efforts to fight corruption in Ukraine date back to early years of the independent statehood. In
December 1992 then Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma announced that the government of Ukraine will
establish strict control over illegal revenues; [it] has been already fighting hard against corruption...
Gradually the process of countering corruption began to institutionalize. Under the presidency of
Leonid Kravchuk in November 1993, the coordination Committee for Fighting Corruption and
Organized Crime, led by the president himself, was established pursuant to the presidential decree #
561/93. The legal framework for an offensive on corruption was developed by the 12th parliament and
finalized in the law On Fighting Corruption , adopted on October 5, 1995. The law defined corruption
as activities of persons authorized to perform state functions, aiming at illicit use of the powers they
have been given for receiving material gains, services, benefits or other advantages . Later on, in April
1997 the list of subjects of corrupt practices was expanded to include members of the parliament of
Ukraine, the parliament of the Crimea, elected representatives of local and regional Councils of
People's Deputies and officials of local self-governance bodies.
The government, too, adopted a number of official programs designed to prevent the spread of
corruption. In February 1997 President Kuchma announced an anticorruption campaign that he
compared to an earlier campaign undertaken in Poland as the Clean Hands . The establishment of the
National Bureau of Investigation had been announced at the April 24, 1997 session of the Coordination
Council for Fighting Corruption and Organized Crime, but the new formation had never been
legitimized by law-makers and was finally abolished in December 1999 by the President's decree on
administrative reform. The next step against corruption was the President's decree On the Concept of
Fighting Corruption in 1998-2005 , approved on April 28, 1998 and designed to complete the
anticorruption legislation. The document contained a number of proposals as to how to limit
possibilities to use illicit transactions and revenues, primarily the so-called analysis of anonymous hard
currency accounts . Among other things, the document ordered annulment of parliamentary immunity,
providing for transparency of political party financing, control over incomes and spending of leaders
and activists of political parties .
In an effort to encourage foreign investors, the Council for Foreign Investment was established under
the auspices of the President of Ukraine. The Councils that includes representatives of the worlds'
leading corporations is supposed to meet twice a year to discuss problems faced by foreign investors,
but it is unclear whether the arrangement actually makes a difference. Problems faced by some foreign
investors resulted in a major scandal in 1998, when the U.S. Congress had to interfere to urge Ukraine
to protect investors' rights. Yet, so far numerous resolutions, decrees, programs, and explicit demands
from the West have brought little progress in the area.
This government has also made its contribution to the matter of countering corruption, primarily by
announcing its transparency and seeking to uproot causes of corruption. In early July the tradition to
address the issue of corruption every February (or when the international donor community and
financial institutions are about to decide on providing this country with loans and assistance). On July
3, 2000 the Cabinet of Ministers approved an action plan for fighting corruption in 2000. Commenting
on the government's action plan, Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko argued that its implementation
would assist attracting investment to the Ukrainian economy, particularly for privatization of the
energy sector. The Prime Minister stressed that providing for transparency of the privatization process,
particularly in the energy field, is the keystone of successful privatization (Ukraina Moloda, July 7,
2000).
The document introduces a number of measures designed to counter corruption. Among the most
significant of them is the provision for operative monitoring of the privatization process aiming at
preventing crime and power abuse in the area. The steady ingredient of fighting corruption - preventing
conflict of interest and power abuse by regional and local state and self-governance officials - received
a new turn in the process of reforming property relations in the agrarian sector to prevent violation of
property rights. The action plan also includes drafting, by November 1, 2000, of a presidential decree
on establishment of a National Anticorruption Committee under the auspices of the President of
Ukraine, and opening its local public offices in the regions. In addition, the action plan provides for
organization and implementation of a series of actions designed to disclose corruption in budget-funded
institutions and compensation of damages caused by corrupt practices of officials (Ukraina Moloda,
July 7, 2000).
However, notwithstanding the importance of the event and certain difficulties related to the program (it
was approved at the government's session only during the third try, - Ukraina Moloda, July 4, 2000) -
the fact of initiation of new government's anticorruption measures went almost unnoticed by the
general public and, therefore, the anticorruption part of the government's session generated little, if any,
societal response. The reason was simple: there was practically no information about the event and the
new anticorruption initiative which the government failed to duly publicize. This lack of transparency
of the corruption issue itself, and of official procedures of countering it can partly explain the general
skepticism about effectiveness of the measures in the Ukrainian society. For instance, according to the
late 1999 survey in Kyiv by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 58.7% of the respondents
believed that the government did nothing or next to nothing to prevent proliferation of corruption and
to ensure effective anticorruption measures. Over two thirds (77.1%) of the respondents agreed that
some actions of the government, in fact, contributed to proliferation of corruption. Specifically, those
included giving immunity to members of national and subnational elected authorities and judges
(48%), giving too broad powers to civil servants and officials (39.4%) and leaving loop-holes for
corruption in legal acts (37%) (Molod Ukrainy, October 29, 1999).
Instead, another event, directly linked to the theme of corruption - the case of former Prime Minister
Pavlo Lazarenko and millions of dollars he had embezzled while occupying the top government
position, and the future of one of his former allies, Mykola Agafonov, MP - gained remarkable
publicity.
In early July 2000, the jury in Geneva found Lazarenko guilty of money laundering. According to
Lazarenko's lawyer, his client cooperated with the investigation and admitted having laundered US$ 9
million of Ukraine's public money through Swiss banks. According to the lawyer, over US$ 6.5 million
were withdrawn from Lazarenko's accounts (Silski Visti, July 4, 2000). The demand for his extradition
to Switzerland was dropped. The investigation believed that Lazarenko's illicit transactions totaled
about US$ 900 million. Currently Ukraine's former prime minister is in prison in the United States
where he is facing a charge of laundering US$ 114 million through American banks. This information,
however, is vigorously denied by his Ukrainian lawyers.
The situation of Mykola Agafonov, MP, is more complex. In early June 2000 the Parliamentary
Committee for Procedures and Parliamentary Ethics announced its intention to initiate a motion for
bringing Mr. Agafonov to trial. Commenting on the intention, the parliament's vehement corruption
fighter Hryhory Omelchenko, MP, told the press: Immediately after Pavlo Lazarenko left the
government and Hryhory Vorsinov [resigned from] the Office of Attorney General, investigators
finally were able to investigate the case of embezzlement of gross amounts of state-owned assets by
officials of the Naukovyi state farm (Ukraina Moloda, June 9, 2000). On January 22, 1997, the Office
of Attorney General opened a criminal case against Mykola Agafonov on charges of embezzlement and
illegal operation of accounts abroad. However, the trial did not occur, as Mr. Agafonov was elected to
the parliament of Ukraine for the majoritarian constituency #28, having defeated 11 competitors and
won 40.8% of the votes. Together with the seat, he got the parliamentary immunity, guaranteed by
Article 80 of the Constitution. The parliament alone could have stripped him of his immunity but was
not in a hurry to do so.
The investigation of activities of the Naukovyi state farm found facts that enabled the prosecution to
initiate a criminal lawsuit against Mykola Agafonov himself on September 14, 1998. A few days later,
on September 25, 1998, Attorney general of Ukraine Mykhailo Potebenko appealed to the parliament
for its agreement to bringing Agafonov to trial on charges of embezzlement of about 20 million
hryvnyas . However, as Mykhailo Potebenko argued at the session of the Coordination Committee for
Fighting Corruption and Organized Crime on November 20, 1998, the appeal had been returned to the
Office of Attorney General. The same reaction was to the appeal of October 26, 1998. The final - for
now - word of the Office of Attorney General in this case was the appeal to the parliament of June 14,
2000. After long and emotional debates, on June 22 the MPs agreed to give permission for arresting
Mykola Agafonov and bringing him to trial. The appeal was supported by 229 MPs, 5 MPs voted
against it, and other 88 MPs who were present at the session that day simply did not vote at all.
Immediately afterwards Mykola Agafonov announced that the process against him was a political order
. The opinion was shared by some MPs. For instance, Georgy Kriuchkov, member of the Communist
faction (that voted very actively for withdrawing Agafonov's parliamentary immunity) argued that the
Office of Attorney General took strong effort particularly in the case of Agafonov, former member of
the Hromada opposition party (Den, June 23 2000). However, claims about repression against the
opposition would be a clear exaggeration: by the time the prosecution's appeal arrived to the parliament
Mykola Agafonov was a member of the non-left parliamentary majority, and a member of one of the
parliament's most influential factions, Oleksandr Volkov's 35-strong Vidrodzhennya Rehioniv (
Regional Renaissance ). In that sense the voting was yet another test for the endurance and integrity of
the parliamentary majority. The situation of the MPs was not an easy one: on the one hand, there was a
certain spirit of corporate solidarity, on the other hand - the charges of the Office of Attorney General
and the open voting procedure that immediately showed who is who . As Deputy Attorney General
Mykola Obikhod stated in his address to MPs in the parliament's session hall, the documents included
specific facts and evidence of many foreign banks in which Mr. Agafonov had opened accounts, and
foreign companies with which he had dealt. The evidence, Mr. Obikhod argued, allowed charging Mr.
Agafonov with having committed a crime. One of the reported episodes of the case contained evidence
that Mr. Agafonov had given at least US$ 1,205 thousand of his profits with Pavlo Lazarenko (Silski
Visti, June 23, 2000). To ensure that the suspect did not flee, the law-enforcement authorities insisted
on arresting him. Seeking to cope with the moral challenge, the Parliamentary Committee for
Procedures and Parliamentary Ethics suggested a compromise, allowing bringing Agafonov to trial but
preventing his arrest. However, the MPs supported both of the demands made by the Office of Attorney
General.
Hence, Mykola Agafonov became the third MP in Ukraine's history to be stripped of his parliamentary
immunity. The two other, however, managed to escape the Ukrainian pre-trial detention facilities. The
first one was Yukhym Zviahilsky, MP and former Acting Prime Minister of Ukraine. On November 15,
1994, the parliament resolved to strip him of his parliamentary immunity. Before the law-enforcement
authorities put their hands on him, Mr. Zviahilsky managed to flee to Israel. Only on February 12,
1997, the Ukrainian parliament abolished its own resolution by 253 votes and invited Mr. Zviahilsky to
arrive to Ukraine for protecting his rights in the issue raised by the Office of Attorney General of
Ukraine . Later on, the Office of Attorney General dropped its charges against Zviahilsky. In late
October 1998, new Attorney General Mykhailo Potebenko announced that the Zviahilsky case was
closed down for the reason of the absence of crime in the part concerning the present member of the
parliament of Ukraine (Den, October 29, 1998).
The second case was Pavlo Lazarenko, then, in December 1998, considered in connection with the case
of Mykola Agafonov. On February 17, 1999 the parliament resolved to strip Pavlo Lazarenko of his
parliamentary immunity. Mykola Agafonov was not mentioned at all. Yet, in the case of Lazarenko
Ukraine's law-enforcement authorities have been unable to carry out its professional duty: Pavlo
Lazarenko promptly disappeared to the United States.
Mykola Agafonov appears to be the unlucky one: he has arrested and now is expecting the trial.
However, the case is not close to the logical end. In early July Mr. Agafonov publicly urged the
parliament to appeal to the Office of Attorney General so that his case was brought to the court as soon
as possible (Ukraina Moloda, July 5, 2000). He argued that notwithstanding Mykhailo Potebenko's
promise that the case would go to court urgently, there had been little action in that direction.
Agafonov's appeal to the parliament was read in the session hall by Volodymyr Nechyporuk, MP, his
colleague from the Vidrodzhennya Rehioniv, a faction that had also produced a number of votes in
favor of allowing arrest and trial of the fellow MP. According to Volodymyr Nechyporuk, Mykhailo
Agafonov is dying but they do not let doctors see him. He argued that Mykola Agafonov, suffering
from stomach cancer and diabetes, was starving for ten days because he could not eat and urgently
needed medical examination (Vysokyi Zamok, July 5, 2000). However, Speaker Ivan Pliushch referred
to conclusions of the legal department and refused to have a new voting on the issue (Silski Visti, July
6, 2000). Hence, all questions about Mykola Agafonov should be answered by the court, but it is still
unclear when it is going to take place.
Meanwhile, the Agafonov case enabled the Ukrainian authorities to add some points to the score of
their anticorruption efforts. Just a few points, given the length of the case and Agafonov's political
insignificance. On the other hand, it created an unpleasant feeling of attacking the easy prey, while
major anticorruption cases still have to be addressed.
